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Supreme Court Decisions
EQUITY-SUIT TO SET ASIDE CONVEYANCE-FRAUD--AGENCYCORPORATIONS-Gutheil vs. Polichio-No.14268-Decided Jan-

uary 16, 1939-DistrictCourt of Arapahoe County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Suit brought to set aside conveyance of and trust deed on
real estate owned in name of corporation on ground that it was transferred for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding creditors.
HELD: 1. Where it appears that judgment debtor's association
with corporation holding title to property was so close and exclusive
that it strips the company of its corporate cloak and leaves the debtor
standing in its place, holding in one hand the "accredited agency" of his
wife to do whatever he deemed best for her and himself, and-in the other
hand the minute book of the corporation with the opportunity of making whatever entries were necessary to meet a given situation, the courts
"will disregard the fiction of the corporate entity apart from the members
of the corporation when it is attempted to be used as a means of accomplishing a fraud or an illegal act.' "
2. Once the corporate entity is dissipated, "the transaction becomes one of dealing between husband and wife, or even one of the husband, with the 'accredited agency' of his wife, dealing with himself,
which, when it obstructs the collection of claims of creditors is presumptively fraudulent."
3. Assuming there was full consideration for the conveyances,
there is no doubt they were made with the intent to fraudulently hinder
and delay creditor from collecting his judgment.
4. Even though wife of judgment creditor "did not participate
in the intent, she is estopped from urging such defense because of the
investiture of her husband with the accredited agency."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Burke concur.

IN DEPARTMENT.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-APPEAL-CERTIORARI-West us.

Judd, et al.-No. 14473-Decided January 16, 1939--County
Court of Denver-Hon. Osmer E. Smith, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought F. E. D. action in Justice Court for nonpayment of rent after serving statutory three day notice. Defendant
filed verified answer admitting that some rental was due but pleaded
there was included in the lease, an agreement to transfer the property to
defendant when "certain sums of money had been paid," and asked that
matter be transferred to District Court. Before trial, defendant tendered
an amended answer in which he amplified the issue, but its filing was denied. In a trial to Justice of the Peace, judgment was given against
defendant for $75 rent and possession of premises and costs.
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The contract to purchase attached to the lease provided that defendant could purchase property after paying $350, but defendant did not
show or allege he paid such sum. The defendant sought review in the
County Court by civil code certiorari, but writ was subsequently
quashed.
HELD: 1. The action was grounded on 1935 C.S.A. Chapter
70, Section 4, opening paragraph and subdivision fourth, which permits
only of appeal by observing special requirements as to bond and deposit
of adjudged unpaid rental. Resort was not had to statutory certiorari
(1935 C.S.A., Chap. 96, Secs. 132-139), permissible in unusual situations as a " 'substitute for an appeal.' "
2. The contention of the defendant "that regardless of the quality
of the issue as tendered by the complaint before the justice, his answer
and preferred amended answer operated to so change the issue as to require the justice to certify the case to the district court," is based upon
1935 C.S.A., Chap. 70, Sec. 9. This section is without application
since it has only to do with actions brought under the sixth to ninth
subdivisions of Section 4 of Chapter 70.
3.
" 'It may be that defendants had the right to plead that they
were in possession, not as tenants, but as vendees, but that would not
permit the question of title to be tried, such pleading would only be one
denying the tenancy alleged by plaintiff. * * *' "

Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard.
Mr. Justice Bock concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

Mr. Justice Bouck and

CRIMINAL LAW-BURGLARY AND LARCENY-ACCOMPLICE-DECOY
-INSTRUCTION-Wilson
vs. People-No. 14385-Decided January 23, 1939-District Court of Logan County-Hon. H. E.
Munson, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. One who participates in a felony as a decoy or feigned
accomplice, in order to entrap the other, is not crimirially liable, and he
need not take an officer of the law into his confidence to avoid an imputation of criminal intent.
2. An instruction which makes any assistance in the perpetration
of an offense criminal, whether felonious or not, should not be given.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice
Burke not participating. EN BANC.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION---Jones vs. Pueblo Savings and Trust Co., et

al.-No. 14484-Decided January 23, 1939-District Court of
Pueblo County-Hon. William B. Stewart, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Will construed and found to mean that daughter of
testator had vested interest in one-half of estate at death of father, and
therefore upon her death, her interest in estate goes to her heirs and
administrator of her estate.
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2. The intention of the testator controls, and his intention must,
if possible, be ascertained from the will itself.
3. Where provision in will devises and bequeaths to the daughter
directly and not to a trustee, and the bank is designated as "guardian"
and trustee of her estate for the limitations of time mentioned, the use
of the term "guardian" implies a vested interest in the daughter and a
stewardship by the trust company until she reaches the age specified,
inconsistent with intent to create a purely contingent estate.
4. The law favors the vesting of estates.
5. " 'An estate will vest at the death of the testator unless a later
time for vesting is clearly expressed by the words of the will or by necessary implication therefrom.' "
6. An interpretation which avoids partial intestacy is preferred.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
NEGLIGENCE-MOTOR
WAY-

EVIDENCE

VEHICLES---STATE
-INSURANCE

HIGHWAYS-RIGHT

COMPANIES

OF

-HYPOTHETICAL

QUESTIONS-Johns, et al. vs. Shinal--No. 14205-DecidedJanuary 9, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele,
Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Evidence in automobile accident case examined and
found to contain competent testimony from which a jury might find one
of the drivers to have taken the right of way.
2. In accident occurring outside of the city limits of Denver, the
pertinent right of way statutes provide that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle already
in the intersection; and that when both cars enter the intersection at the
same time, the one on the left shall yield to the one on the right.
3.
Questions touching upon their connection with or interest in
insurance companies may be asked of every prospective juror.
4. The mere statement of a witness, in answer to a proper question, which mentions "insurance company," is not sufficient ground for
a mistrial. On motion, it should be stricken and the jury instructed to
disregard it.
5.
The decision to order a mistrial in such case rests within the
discretion of the trial court.
6. Exclusion of photographs of car taken after the wheel damaged
by the collision bad been replaced by another did not constitute reversible
error.
7. It was not error for the trial court to sustain objections to
hypothetical questions propounded to a physician where the questions
did not state all the facts which one testifying solely as an expert should
assume.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Holland not participating. EN BANC.

DICTA
FRAUD AND DECEIT-PLEADING--PARTIES-Langworthy vs. Republic Mutual Insurance Corporation, et a.-No.
14209-Decided
January 9, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon. Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. "If one in his complaint sets forth material false representations it might be proper, on motion, to require him to state how
and in what manner the representations were false, but unless application is made in apt time that the complaint be made specific in such particulars defendants are not entitled to the information and cannot raise
the issue by demurrer."
2.
Where plaintiff seeks to have title to certain land returned to
her and a note cancelled on the basis of alleged fraud and deceit, the court
must have jurisdiction of all the parties affected and the land. There
was no misjoinder of parties.
3.
The receiver for the corporation defendant stands in the shoes
of the corporation which was a party to the alleged fraud, and is therefore a proper party.
4.
The one who holds the equity in the land and the one who
holds the note and mortgage are also proper parties.
5.
The plaintiff may follow the fruits of the fraud unless they
come into the hands of one who has taken them for value without notice
of the fraud.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bakke, Mr. Justice
Knous, and Mr. Justice Holland dissenting. EN BANC.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-IndustrialCommission, et al. vs. International Mutual Liability Insurance Company, et al.-No. 14404
-Decided
January 9, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon.
Robert W. Steele, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. In determining which insurance carrier was to pay for
death of employee occurring in Adams County, contract of insurance
examined, and although stating, "Locations of all factories, * * * or
other work-places of the assured to which this.Policy shall apply, * * *
are as follows: 'Within City Limits of Florence, Colorado, on East
Main Street,' " held to cover accident.
2.
The Manual of Rules of Industrial Commission, known to
insurance company, provide that the term "risk" shall mean and include
the entire operations in Colorado; and that "under no circumstances
shall a compensation insurance policy be written covering any part of a
given risk, leaving another part of the risk uninsured. * * *"
3. With all the evidence before it, the Industrial Commission,
as a fact-finding body, had the right to place the liability on the insurance
company.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.

DICTA
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AGENCY-REAL ESTATE--SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-INTERVENORS
-Ramey vs. Gent. Craig Lumber Company, et al., IntervenorsNo. 14468-Decided January 9, 1939-DistrictCourt of Moffat
County-Hon. John R. Clark, Judge-Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
1. Where one attempts to convey property of another
HELD:
to a third person, but does not have proper authority, owner may refuse
to ratify and, in turn, convey to his own grantee.
2.
Where a contract for the sale of three parcels of property is
entered into and it appears that the conveyance of parcels 1 and 2 depend
upon conveyance of parcel 3, and it develops that the latter may not be
conveyed, it is error for the court to decree specific performance of the
contract as to the first two parcels.
3.
The intervention of the judgment creditors of one of the parties to the contract falls with the main case.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Holland not participating. EN BANC.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION - MISJOINDER-SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE-Wellshire Land Company vs. City and County
of Denver-No. 14475-Decided January 3, 1939-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: City of Denver brought suit for specific performance to
enforce warranty of defendant company that land conveyed by latter
to city was "free and clear from all former * * * liens, taxes, assessments and encumbrances."
On the date of the deed the land conveyed,
situate in Arapahoe County, was subject to 1936 tax lien in the sum of
$1,261.24. After deed was made company was dissolved and $1,200
placed in hands of its president in trust to pay this tax. On sale for tax,
Arapahoe
County took certificate.
County
commissioners of Arapahoe County were named
as defendants, and part of prayer asked exoneration from taxes while lands were
seized and possessed by city.
Demurrer lodged against complaint for want of facts and misjoinder
of parties overruled by lower court and company elected to stand.
HELD: Against.contention that Section 4, Article X of the state
Constitution, exempting property of municipal corporations from taxation, there are two answers: (1) the lien of record, however, invalid, is
cloud on title, removal thereof compellable; and (2) tax was, and is,
due Arapahoe County, and warranty being for its benefit, is based on
sufficient consideration.
Failure to serve commissioners and abandonment of that phase of

case, misjoinder cannot be asserted.
Point made that judgment for $1,200 in suit for specific performance where sum is impounded in registry of court, is technically right,
but trivial and one of form only, and since company benefited to extent
of $61.24, it cannot complain.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Bakke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

DICTA
PLEADINGS-MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS -EXHIBIT
ATTACHED TO PLEADINGS-FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-

Bailey, etc. vs. Wilkinson, et al.-No. 14466-Decided January9,
1939--County Court of Denver-Hon. Osmer E. Smith, Judge
-Reversed.
HELD: 1. Pleadings in forcible entry and detainer suit examined
and found to be insufficient upon which to base judgment on pleadings.
2. Where plaintiff relies upon sheriff's deed recorded in 1938 and
defendant relies upon deed recorded in 1936, and nothing appears to
show that the lien of the sheriff's deed of 1938 related back to a date
prior to that of defendant's recording, the court could not decide for
plaintiff.
3. Where a copy of the notice and demand served upon defendant
is attached to complaint, only the allegations concerning it in the complaint are sworn to by the plaintiff in the verification of the complaint.
The verification of the pleading does not cover the truth or falsity of the
statements contained in the exhibit.
4. The pleadings should be amended. If the "defendant can
show that he is a tenant of third persons, and if plaintiffs fail to show
that these third persons held the properties subject to a valid lien which
has legally ripened into a valid sheriff's deed, then judgment would of
course be in favor of the defendant. The sheriff's deed has only prima
facie effect."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
TORTS

-

ASSUMPTION OF RISK

-

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

-

Frances Wilson vs. Celia Hill-No. 14046-Decided January 3,
1939-District Court of El Paso County-Hon. John Meikle,
Judge-Judgmentreversed and remanded.
FACTS: The defendant was the driver of a car and plaintiff was
riding therein as her guest. Defendant's arm had previously been operated upon, as a result of which she was unable to properly drive the automobile. At a point between Canon City and Colorado Springs, the defendant, over strong protests from plaintiff, changed places with another
guest who was driving and insisted on driving herself. The question
involved is whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in
remaining in the car when she knew of defendant's incapacity.
HELD: It was error not to instruct the jury that the plaintiff's
remaining in the car might constitute contributory negligence. Contributory negligence can consist of an unreasonable exposure to risk. However, the passenger's duty to leave the automobile must be judged in the
light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, such as the time of
the day or night, the place and surroundings, the availability of other
means of transportation and other pertinent considerations.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.

EN BANC.

DICTA
SEZ THE JEDGE:
"Maybe Leo Thompson was justified in asking a divorce from
Dorothy Meaney Thompson and there might have been plenty of
grounds in the case of Kruel vs. Kruel, but who busted the harp in
Angel vs. Angel?" (Denver divorce records.)
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RECORD FROM LIFE
A Look
Ahead

100
MEN
AT
AGE
25

Saved itand
Kept it

At Age 65
is wealthy
are well to do

Spent itor
Lost it

5 Earn their own
living
54 are not self supporting
36 have died
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